Abstract-Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain replaceable resources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel rooms among travelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers, and sharing regular passes among users. Motivated by the applications of sharing economy, this paper studies a coalition formation game subject to the capacity of K participants per coalition. The participants in each coalition are supposed to split the associated cost according to a given cost-sharing mechanism. A stable coalition structure is established when no group of participants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual payments. We quantify the inefficiency of distributed decision-making processes under a cost-sharing mechanism by the strong price of anarchy (SPoA), comparing a worst-case stable coalition structure and a social optimum. In particular, we derive SPoA for common fair cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., equal-split, proportional-split, egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions of bargaining games, and usage based cost-sharing). We show that the SPoA for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based costsharing (under certain conditions) is Θ(log K), whereas the one for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions is O( √ K log K). Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under common fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of "sharing economy" [1] has created a new paradigm of social and economic networks, which promotes distributed peer-to-peer interactions and bypasses traditional centralized hierarchal service providers and intermediaries. Sharing economy is often facilitated by the advent of pervasive information technology platforms, especially by mobile computing and digital social platforms. One fundamental distributed decision-making process in sharing economy is coalition formation for sharing resources and facilities with excess capacity among users collaboratively and efficiently. We highlight some examples of sharing economy as follows: 1) Hotel Room Sharing: Travelers may share hotel rooms with other fellow travelers, because multiple-occupancy rooms are more economical. The sharing processes are achieved through private arrangements among travelers. 2) Taxi-ride Sharing: Commuters may share taxi-rides because of lower taxi fares, despite that the taxicabs may take a detour to pick-up or drop-off other passengers. 3) Pass Sharing: Certain anonymous regular passes are validated within a certain fixed period of time (e.g.,
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Abridged version of this paper to appear in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems. accesses to public transportation or public facilities), which may be shareable among multiple holders, if they do not overlap in their usage times. Note that this example also applies to co-owning or co-leasing physical properties (e.g., houses, cars and parking lots).
In this paper, we study a class of distributed decisionmaking processes for sharing economy. In particular, we consider the problem with a set of participants forming coalitions to share certain replaceable resources from a large pool of available resources (e.g., hotel rooms, taxicabs, regular passes), such that any subset of participants can always form a coalition using separate resources, independent from other coalitions. We formulate a coalition formation game, wherein participants form arbitrary coalitions of their own accord to share the associated cost, subject to a constraint on the maximum number of participants per coalition.
There are two main aspects investigated in this paper:
1) Inefficiency of Distributed Decision-Making:
Since there is a capacity per coalition such that not all participants can form a single coalition, there will exist potentially multiple coalitions and the self-interested participants will opt for the lower payments. Distributed self-interested behavior often gives rise to outcomes that deviate from a social optimum. A critical question is related to the inefficiency of distributed decision-making processes. We quantify the inefficiency of distributed decision-making processes by the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA), a common metric in Algorithmic Game Theory that compares the worst-case ratio between the self-interested outcomes (that allow any group of users to deviate jointly) and a social optimum [2] - [5] . 2) Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms: Sharing economy can be regarded as an alternative to the for-profit sector, which resembles cooperative organizations and favors distributive justice. When participants share the costs, there is a notion of fairness. We aim to characterize the inefficiency of distributed decision-making under common fair cost-sharing mechanisms. First, we consider typical fair cost-sharing concepts such as equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based cost-sharing. Second, we formulate the cost-sharing problem as a bargaining game. Thus, the well-known bargaining game solutions (e.g., egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions) [6] can be applied in the context of sharing economy.
This paper presents a comprehensive study for the SPoA of a general model of coalition formation, considering various common fair cost-sharing mechanisms. 
A. Our Contributions
We consider K-capacitated coalitions, where K is the maximum number of sharing participants per coalition. A stable coalition structure, wherein no group of participants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual payments, is a likely self-interested outcome. The results in this paper are summarized as follows (and in Table I ).
1) The SPoA for any budget balanced cost-sharing mechanism is O(K). 2) However, the SPoA for equal-split and proportional-split cost-sharing is only Θ(log K).
3) The SPoA for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions is O( √ K log K). 4) The SPoA for usage based cost-sharing is generally Ω(K). However, we provide natural sufficient conditions to improve the SPoA to be Θ(log K), which apply to the examples of sharing economy in this paper. 5) Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under common fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency. 6) We also study the existence of stable coalition structures.
II. RELATED WORK
Our problem belongs to the topic of network cost-sharing and hedonic coalition formation problems [7] - [15] . A study particularly related to our results is the price of anarchy for stable matching and the various extensions to K-sized coalitions [16] , [17] . Our coalition formation game is a subclass of hedonic coalition formation games [8] , [13] that allows arbitrary coalitions subject to a constraint on the maximum number of participants per coalition. This model appears to be realistic in many practical settings of sharing economy 1 . Our work differs from typical cooperative games. In our coalition formation game, each player joins a coalition that incurs a lower individual payment, under a given cost-sharing mechanism. On the other hand, typical cooperative games generally do not consider a specific cost-sharing mechanism, but find a cost-sharing allocation according to certain axioms.
One may regard the results about stable matching in [16] , [17] as a special case of K = 2 in our model. However, unlike the stable matching problem, our model has additional structure that can be harnessed for tighter results (e.g., monotonicity). For example, according to [16] , the price of anarchy for Matthew's effect (equivalently, proportionalsplit cost-sharing) can be unbounded. Here with the help of monotonicity, we show that it is Θ(log K). We also study other cost-sharing mechanisms, such as egalitarian, Nash bargaining solutions, and usage based cost-sharing mechanisms that are not considered in [16] , [17] . Moreover, [17] is based on the comparison of the utility of a stable matching, while our results are based on the comparison of the cost of a stable coalition structure. Although it is possible to derive some of our results (for K = 2) from the previous results, the bounds obtained this way are typically weaker than ours and the gap can increase as a linear function of K.
Network cost-sharing games with capacitated links and non-anonymous cost functions [15] , [18] , [19] are closely related to our problem. Non-anonymous cost functions may depend on the identity of the players in the coalition, so as to capture the asymmetries between the players because of different service requirements. In [15] , a logarithmic upper bound on the price of anarchy considering the Shapley value in network cost-sharing games with non-anonymous submodular cost functions was given. Our problem can be modeled by a network cost-sharing game with non-anonymous cost functions. In particular, our model is a special case of a Kcapacitated network cost-sharing game with a simple structure of n parallel links and non-anonymous cost functions such that a strategy profile of the users in the network game corresponds to a coalition structure 2 . However, the key difference of our model from those in [7] , [11] , [15] is that we consider replaceable resources from a large pool of available resources, such that a subset of deviating users can always form a new coalition, independent from other users. This is not true in general network cost-sharing games, when there are limited resources (e.g., links) that a deviating coalition of players can utilize, and it may not be possible to form arbitrary coalitions independent from others. Our model allows us to derive strong price of anarchy bounds for diverse cost-sharing mechanisms, whereas only specific cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., the Shapley value) were considered in general network cost-sharing games.
It is also worth mentioning how our results of usage based cost-sharing relate to cost-sharing with anonymous cost functions in network design games [7] or connection games [11] . On one hand, our model is simpler as we do not assume connectivity requirements in a network, but only an abstract setting that allows arbitrary coalitions up to a certain capacity (but we allow non-anonymous cost functions). On the other hand, one of the cost-sharing mechanisms we consider (i.e., usage based cost-sharing) resembles in some sense that used in [7] , [11] if we interpret the resources used by one participant as his chosen path or tree in the network design game. Similar to the case in [7] (with respect to strong Nash equilibrium), a usage based cost-sharing mechanism may not admit a stable coalition structure. Noteworthily, the strong price of anarchy in usage based cost-sharing in our model can increase as a linear function of K. Nonetheless, we provide general sufficient conditions for usage based cost-sharing to induce logarithmic strong price of anarchy.
III. MODEL
This section presents a general model of coalition formation for sharing certain resources, motivated by the applications of sharing economy. Consider an n-participant cooperative game in coalition form. The coalitions formed by the subsets of participants are associated with a real-valued cost function. The participants in a coalition are supposed to split the cost according to a certain payment function. However, as a departure from traditional cooperative games, there is a capacity per coalition, such that not all participants can form a single coalition. Hence, when given a payment function, the participants will opt for coalitions that lead to lower individual payments subject to a capacity per coalition.
A. Problem Formulation
The set of n participants is denoted by N . A coalition structure is a partition of N denoted by P ⊂ 2 N , such that G∈P G = N and G 1 ∩ G 2 = ∅ for any pair G 1 , G 2 ∈ P. Let the set of all partitions of N be P. Each element G ∈ P is called a coalition. The set of singleton coalitions, P self {{i} : i ∈ N }, is called the default coalition structure, wherein no one forms a coalition with others. This paper considers arbitrary coalition structures with at most K participants per coalition, which is motivated by scenarios of sharing replaceable resources; see Section III-B for examples. The notion of resources will be introduced later in Sec. III-A2, and our model does not always rely on the notion of resources. In practice, K is often much less than n. Let P K {P ∈ P : |G| ≤ K for each G ∈ P} be the set of feasible coalition structures, such that each coalition consists of at most K participants.
1) Cost Function:
A cost c(G) (also known as a characteristic function) is assigned to each coalition of participants G ∈ P ∈ P K , subject to the following properties:
Monotonicity captures natural coalition formation with increasing cost as the number of participants. The total cost of coalition structure P is denoted by c(P) G∈P c(G). For brevity, we also denote c({i}) by c i , where c i is called the default cost of participant i, that is, when i forms no coalition with others. When a subset of participants are indexed by N = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i j } ⊆ N , we simply denote the corresponding default costs by {c 1 , c 2 , ..., c j }.
A K-capacitated social optimum is a coalition structure P * K ∈ P K that minimizes the total cost:
When K = 2, a social optimum P * K can be found in polynomial time by reducing the coalition formation problem to a (general graph) matching problem. When K > 2, K-MINCOALITION is an NP-hard problem (see Appendix).
2) Canonical Resources: There is often a resource being shared by each coalition (e.g., a hotel room, a taxicab, a pass). The resources are usually replaceable from a large pool of available resources in the sharing economy. Hence, any subset of participants can always form a coalition using separate resources, independent from other coalitions. For each coalition G, we consider a canonical resource, which is a class of replaceable resources that can satisfy G, rather than any specific resource. The canonical resource shared by a coalition will not be affected by the canonical resources shared by other coalitions. Because of the consideration of canonical resources, our model exhibits different properties than the network sharing games with limited resources [15] , [18] , [19] .
Let R(G) be the feasible set of canonical resources that can satisfy coalition G. It is naturally assumed that R(H) ⊇ R(G), when H ⊆ G, because the canonical resources that can satisfy a larger coalition G should also satisfy a smaller coalition H (by ignoring the participants in G\H). Each canonical resource r ∈ R(G) is characterized by a cost c r , and a set of involved facilities F (r). Each facility f ∈ F (r) carries a cost c f , such that f ∈F (r) c f = c r . We do not require that every participant of G utilizes the same facilities. Let F i (r) ⊆ F (r) be the set of facilities utilized by participant i ∈ G, when r is shared by G. Let r(G) ∈ arg min r∈R(G) {c r } be the lowest cost canonical resource for coalition G. Hence, we set c(G) = c r(G) and monotonicity is satisfied. If there are multiple lowest cost canonical resources, one is selected by a certain deterministic tie-breaking rule.
B. Motivating Examples
We present a few motivating examples in sharing economy to illustrate the aforementioned model. is the departure time, and A i is the area of preferred locations of hotels. Let K be the maximum number of travelers that can share a room. A canonical resource is a room booking r, associated with a tuple (t in r , t out r , a r ), where t in r is the check-in time, t out r is the check-out time, and a r is the hotel location. We assume that there is a large pool of available rooms for each location, and we do not consider a specific room. The feasible set R(G) is a set of room bookings shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
for all i ∈ G.
(Note that the monotonicity assumption is satisfied: R(H) ⊇ R(G), when H ⊆ G.) In this example, F (r) is be the set of days during [t in r , t out r ] for room booking r, and F i (r) be the set of days that i stays in room booking r. For each f ∈ F (r), c f is the hotel rate of day f .
2) Taxi-ride Sharing: Consider N as a set of passengers to share taxi-rides. Each passenger i ∈ N is associated with a tuple (v 
is the arrival timeslot of ride r at location v. Note that the hotel room sharing problem may be regarded as a one-dimensional version of the taxi-ride sharing problem, if the preferred location constraint is not considered, and we let each tuple (t in i , t out i ) in hotel room sharing problem be the source and destination locations. Let F (r) is the set of road segments traversed by ride r, and F i (r) be the set of road segments that i travels in ride r. For each f ∈ F (r), let c f be the taxi fare for road segment f .
3) Pass Sharing: Consider N as a set of regular-pass holders who want to form coalitions to share some anonymous passes. Each user i ∈ N is associated with a set of required usage timeslots T i . Let K be the maximum number of sharing users, so as to limit the hassle of circulating the pass. A canonical resource is a pass r, associated with a set of allowable timeslots T r . We assume that there is a large pool of available passes, and we do not consider a specific pass. The feasible set R(G) is a set of passes shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
, no one overlaps in their required timeslots); 3) i∈G T i ⊆ T r . This setting also applies to sharing physical properties (e.g., houses, cars and parking lots). Let F (r) are the set of timeslots required by pass r, and c f be the cost of each timeslot in F (r). A user needs to cover the cost when he uses the pass or shares the cost with other participants when no one uses it. Hence, let F i (r) = T i ∪ T r \( j∈G T j ) , when i shares pass r in coalition G.
C. Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
A coalition of participants G are supposed to share the cost c(G). Let the cost (or payment) contributed by participant i ∈ G be p i (G). The utility of participant i is given by:
The following natural properties can be satisfied by payment function p i (·):
If non-positive payment is allowed, then it possible that p i (G) < 0 for some i ∈ G. This paper considers the following fair cost-sharing mechanisms. Note that only usage based cost-sharing mechanism takes into account the notion of resources, while the other costsharing mechanisms do not rely on the notion of resources.
1) Equal-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split equally among all participants: for i ∈ G,
2) Proportional-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split proportionally according to the participants' default costs:
. This approach is also called Matthew's effect in [16] .
3) Bargaining Based Cost-Sharing: One can formulate the cost-sharing problem as a bargaining game with a feasible set and a disagreement point. In our model, the feasible set is the set of utilities (u i ) i∈G , such that
The disagreement point is (u i = 0) i∈G , such that each participant pays only the respective default cost. There are two bargaining solutions in the literature [6] :
• Egalitarian Bargaining Solution is given by:
Namely, every participant in each coalition has the same utility:
for all i ∈ G. Note that non-positive payment is possible because it may need to compensate those with low default costs to reach equal utility at every participant 3 .
• Nash Bargaining Solution is given by:
One can impose an additional constraint of nonnegative payments: p i (G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G. 4) Usage Based Cost-Sharing: Also known as Shapley cost-sharing [7] . We consider a cost-sharing mechanism that takes into account the usage structure of resources of participants. Recall that r(G) denotes a lowest cost canonical resource for coalition G. Let N f (r(G)) be the set of participants that share the same facility f in r(G). The cost is split equally among the participants who utilize the same facilities:
For example, in taxi-ride sharing, passengers will split the cost equally for each road segment with those passengers traveled together in the respective road segment.
D. Stable Coalition and Strong Price of Anarchy
Given payment function p i (·), a coalition of participants G is called a blocking coalition with respect to coalition structure P if all participants in G can strictly reduce their payments when they form a coalition G to share the cost instead. A coalition structure is called stable coalition structure, denoted byP K ∈ P K , if there exists no blocking coalition with respect toP K . The existence of a stable coalition structure depends on the cost-sharing mechanism. There always exists a stable coalition structure for equal-split, proportional-split cost sharing mechanisms, egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution. But a stable coalition structure may not exist in usage based cost-sharing mechanisms. However, there exists stable coalition structure in special cases, for example, pass sharing problem and hotel room sharing problem when K = 2. See Appendix for a detailed discussion.
Note that a stable coalition structure is also a strong Nash equilibrium 4 in our model. However, there is a difference between the case of sharing canonical resources and that of limited resources. For sharing canonical resources, an additional member can join certain an existing coalition to create a larger coalition, only if all of the participants in the new coalition will not be worse-off after the change. Otherwise, the existing coalition can always reject the additional member by keeping the current canonical resource. However, for sharing limited resources, a coalition may be forced to accept an additional member, even they will be worse-off, because they cannot find a new resource to share with. In this case, a strong Nash equilibrium may not be a stable coalition structure.
Define the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) as the worstcase ratio between the cost of a stable coalition structure and that of a social optimum over any feasible costs subject to (C1)-(C2):
Specifically, the strong price of anarchy when using specific cost-sharing mechanisms are denoted by SPoA
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS Before we derive the SPoA for various cost-sharing mechanisms, we present some preliminary results that will be useful in our proofs. In the following we denote the K-th harmonic number by H K K s=1 1 s . Theorem 1. Recall the default coalition structure P self {i} : i ∈ N . We have
Consider a budget balanced payment function p i (·). LetP K be a respective K-capacitated stable coalition structure. Then,
Hence, the SPoA for
Proof. First, by monotonicity, we obtain for any
Hence,
Since P * K is a stable coalition structure, then p i (G) ≤ c i for every G ∈ P * K . Otherwise, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce his payment by forming a singleton coalition individually.
Lastly, since p i (·) is a budget balanced payment function, it follows that
However, we will show that the SPoA for various costsharing mechanisms is O(log K) or O(
To derive an upper bound for the SPoA, the following lemma provides a general tool. First, define the following notation for a non-negative payment function p i (·):
where H 1 , ..., H K are a collection of subsets, such that each
is a budget balanced non-negative payment function. Given a K-capacitated stable coalition structureP K , and a feasible coalition structure P ∈ P K , then
Thus, ifP K is a worst-case stable coalition structure and P = P * K is a social optimal coalition structure, then we obtain an upper bound for the SPoA with respect to {p i (·)} i∈N : 
Hence, the SPoA, SPoA K , with respect to {p i (·)} i∈N is upper bounded by
Note that [14] uses an approach called summability similar to that of Lemma 1. Informally, a payment function (or costsharing mechanism) p i (·) is said to be α-summable if for every subset H of participants and every possible ordering σ on H, the sum of the payments of the participants as they are added one-by-one according to σ is at most α · c(H). However, [14] relies on the notion of cross-monotonicity for proving summability. A payment function p i (·) is said to satisfy crossmonotonicity, if for any G ⊆ G , p i (G ) ≤ p i (G). [15] showed that if a payment function satisfies cross-monotonicity in a network cost-sharing game, then summability can bound the price of anarchy. Also, cross-monotonicity implies that a Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, our model is simpler than network cost-sharing games; Lemma 1 shows that α {p i (·)} can be used to bound SPoA K without the assumption of cross-monotonicity. In particular, many payment functions may violate cross-monotonicity (e.g., egalitarian, Nash bargaining solution, equal-split and proportionalsplit), and hence, the approach in [14] will not apply to these payment functions.
V. EQUAL-SPLIT COST-SHARING MECHANISM
Theorem 2. For equal-split cost-sharing, the SPoA is upper bounded by SPoA
Proof
which follows from the monotonicity of cost function, c(H s ) ≤ c(H 1 ).
A. Tight Example
We also present a tight example to show that SPoA 
Note 
B. Proportional-split Cost-Sharing Mechanism
Given cost function c(·), we define a truncated cost functioñ c(·) as follows:
) be the SPoA with respect to cost function c(·) specifically.
Lemma 2. For proportional-split cost-sharing,
Proof. First, we show that ifP is a stable coalition structure, then for any G ∈P, we have c(G) ≤ j∈G c j . If we assume c(G) > j∈G c j for some G ∈P, then for all i ∈ G,
Namely, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce his payment by forming a singleton coalition individually. This is a contradiction to the fact thatP is a stable coalition structure. Second, we note that if P * is a social optimum, then for any G ∈ P * , we have c(G) ≤ j∈G c j . Otherwise, P * does not attain the least total cost by including G.
Therefore, we obtain
Theorem 3. For proportional-split cost-sharing, the SPoA is upper bounded by
Proof. By Lemma 2 we may assume without loss of generality that c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Applying Lemma 1 with
where , we obtain 
which follows from Lemma 3 and cŝ ≤ 1.
Note that one can strengthen the SPoA by SPoA pp K ≤ H K for K ≤ 6. We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A to show that SPoA 
It follows that
Hence,ŝ
VI. BARGAINING BASED COST-SHARING MECHANISMS
First, we show that the SPoA for egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments) are equivalent. However, there is a difficulty, when we apply Lemma 1 to obtain an upper bound for the SPoA -we can only obtain an upper bound as O(K) by the payment function of egalitarian bargaining solution, whereas the payment function of Nash bargaining solution under the constraint of non-negative payments is not convenient to analyze. But we show a property in Nash bargaining solution, namely that there always exists a coalition structure that satisfies positive payments and its cost is at most ( √ K + 1) from that of a given coalition structure. We then obtain an upper bound as O( √ K log K) for the SPoA using this property.
A. Equivalence between Egalitarian and Nash Bargaining
Lemma 4. If the constraint of non-negative payments is not considered in Nash bargaining solution, then egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions are equivalent:
Proof. This follows from the fact that the feasible set of Nash bargaining solution is bounded by the hyperplane i∈G u i = i∈G c i − c(G). The maximal of i∈G u i (i.e., Nash bargaining solution) is attained at the point u i = u j for any i, j ∈ G.
Lemma 5. For Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), given a stable coalition structureP ∈ P K and G ∈P, then every participant has non-negative payment:
Namely, each stable coalition structure with the constraint of non-negative payments coincides with a stable coalition structure without the constraint of non-negative payments.
Proof. Consider a coalition G = {i 1 , ..., i K } ∈P, with default costs denoted by {c 1 , ..., c K }. We prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that p nash is (G) < 0 for some i s ∈ G. Then,
Thus, we obtain
where c(G\{i s }) ≤ c(G) by monotonicity of the cost function. For any i k = i s ,
Namely, all users in G\{i s } would reduce strictly their payments by switching to the coalition G\{i s }. This is a contradiction to the fact thatP is a stable coalition structure. Lemma 6. For egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions (irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), we obtain
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. First, we show that ifP is a stable coalition structure, then for any G ∈P, we obtain c(G) ≤ t∈G c t based on a contradiction. If we assume c(G) > t∈G c t for some G ∈P, then for all i ∈ G,
This is a contradiction, sinceP cannot be a stable coalition structure. Second, we note that if P * is a social optimum, then for any G ∈ P * , we obtain c(G) ≤ t∈G c t . Therefore, by Corollary 1, we obtain SPoA
B. Bounding Strong Price of Anarchy Theorem 4. For egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of nonnegative payments), the SPoA is upper bounded by
Proof. First, by Lemma 6, it suffices to consider egalitarian bargaining solution with cost function satisfying c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Next, by Lemma 8, there exists a coalition structureP, such that p nash i (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈P, and c(P) ≤ ( √ K + 1) · c(P * K ), where P * K is a social optimum. For a stable coalition structureP K , We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A to show that SPoA Lemma 8. Suppose c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Given any coalition structure P ∈ P K , there exists a coalition structurẽ
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 10. Let b s c(H s ). Consider the following maximization problem:
The maximum of (M1) is upper bounded by y
In Lemma 10, constraint (48) captures positive payment for every participant in H 1 .
VII. USAGE BASED COST-SHARING MECHANISM
Recall that r(G) is the lowest cost canonical resource for G, and F i (r(G)) is the set of facilities utilized by participant i ∈ G in canonical resource r(G). First, for each subset L ⊆ G, we define
Namely, X G (L) is the total cost of facilities of canonical resource r(G) that are only used by the coalition L exclusively. See Fig. 2 for an illustration of X G (L). Usage based payment function can be reformulated as
Given a set of participants {i 1 , ...i K } and H s {i s , ..., i K }, we simply write X s (L) X Hs (L).
In general, the strong price of anarchy of usage based costsharing can be Ω(K).
Theorem 5. For usage based cost-sharing in general settings, there exists an instance, such that
A. Monotone Utilization
Generally SPoA ub K = Ω(K), but we next present a general sufficient condition for inducing SPoA ub K = Θ(log K). The set of facilities utilized by participants F i (·) are said to satisfy monotone utilization, if for all H ⊆ G,
Namely, the total cost of facilities utilized by a subset of participants increases in a larger coalition. Note that monotone utilization condition implies monotonicity of cost function. For hotel room sharing problem, a set of days of a participant stays in a room booking does not depend on the coalition, and hence, F i (r(H)) = F i (r(G)). For taxi-ride sharing problem, one needs to travel a greater distance in order to pick-up and drop-off other passengers when sharing with more passengers, and hence, monotone utilization condition is satisfied. Although pass sharing problem does not generally satisfy monotone utilization condition, we will later prove that the SPoA for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost is also Θ(log K).
Theorem 6. Consider usage based cost-sharing, such that F i (·) satisfies the monotone utilization condition. Then
We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A to show that SPoA 
B. Pass Sharing
Pass sharing problem violates monotone utilization condition. But we can bound the SPoA for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost c f = 1.
Theorem 7.
Consider usage based cost-sharing for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost c f = 1. Then
VIII. EXISTENCE OF STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES
This section completes the study by investigating the existence of stable coalition structures considering different costsharing mechanisms. First, we define a cyclic preference as sequences (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , ..., G s ) , where
. . .
Lemma 11. If there exists no cyclic preference, there always exists a stable coalition structure. Furthermore, such a stable coalition structure can be found in time n O(K) .
By Lemma 11, we can show that there always exists a stable coalition structure for equal-split, proportional-split cost sharing mechanisms, egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash bargaining solution. See Appendix for full proofs. In general, usage based cost-sharing can induce cyclic preference, and hence, possibly the absence of a stable coalition structure. However, we show the existence of a stable coalition structure in some special cases, for example, pass sharing problem and hotel room sharing problem when K = 2 (see Appendix).
IX. CONCLUSION
Sharing economy is a popular paradigm for social and economic interactions with distributed decision-making processes. Motivated by the applications of sharing economy, this paper studies a coalition formation game with a constraint on the maximum number of sharing participants per coalition. This coalition formation game can capture a number of applications of sharing economy, such as hotel room, taxi-ride and pass sharing problems. A number of cost-sharing mechanisms are considered, wherein each participant is interested in joining a coalition with a lower payment in the respective cost-sharing mechanism. We study stable coalitions, wherein no coalition of participants can deviate unilaterally to form lower cost coalitions, as the likely self-interested outcomes.
To quantify the inefficiency of distributed decision-making processes, we show that the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) between a worst-case stable coalition and the social optimum for egalitarian and Nash solutions is O( √ K log K), whereas the one for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based cost-sharing (under monotone consumption condition or for pass sharing problem) is only Θ(log K), where K is the maximum capacity of sharing participants. Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under common fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency.
In future work, we will also study other cost-sharing mechanisms. The SPoA for egalitarian and Nash solutions (i.e., O( √ K log K)) is not known to be tight. It is interesting to see if the gap will be closed. Furthermore, the SPoA for specific problems (e.g., hotel room, taxi-ride and pass sharing problems) may be strictly smaller than Θ(log K). A companion study of empirical SPoA for taxi-ride sharing using real-world taxi data can be found in [21] . Lemma 8. Suppose c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G. Given any coalition structure P ∈ P K , there exists a coalition structurẽ
Proof. Given coalition structure P, we construct coalition structureP as follows. For each G ∈ P, we sort the participants G = {i 1 , ..., i m } in the decreasing order of their default costs, such that
where t ∈ {1, ..., R} and m 0 = 0. By monotonicity of c(·) and the ordering on c i , Eqns. (54)- (55) imply that each i k ∈ N t satisfies
and
By Lemma 7, the above conditions can guarantee positive payments in Nash bargaining solution. We then replace each coalition G ∈ P by a collection of coalitions N 1 , ..., N R . We call such a coalition structureP. Note that for each i k ∈ N t+1 ,
where n t |N t | = m t − m t−1 . Without loss of generality, we assume c(G) = 1. Letc t c mt−1+1 and C t c(N t ). It is evident to see that 1 ≥c 1 >c 2 > ... >c R > 0. Since c(G) ≤ j∈G c j for any G, C t ≤ n tct for all t ∈ {1, ..., K}.
We next upper bound R t=1 C t by the following optimization problem (S1):
where we assumec R+1 = 0. Since in (S1) the lower bounds on n t are only present in Constraints (60), we assume n t = Ct yt , where y t c t −c t+1 for t = 1, ..., R, and obtain
Note that (S2) is simply a fractional knapsack problem.
Suppose that (y t ) R t=1 are arranged in a non-increasing order, y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y R . Let be the largest index such that
Then the optimal solution (C * t ) R t=1 to (S2) is given by Lemma 9. Hence, the optimal value of (S2) is
By the arithmetic mean-harmonic mean inequality (i.e.,
Hence, it follows that ≤ √ K, and the maximum of (S2) is upper bounded by √ K + 1. Therefore, this completes the proof by
Lemma 9. The fractional knapsack problem is defined by
Suppose that (y t ) R t=1 are positive and arranged in a nonincreasing order, y 1 ≥ y 2 ≥ · · · ≥ y R . Let be the largest index such that
Then the optimal solution (C * t ) R t=1 to (FKP) is given by
Proof. The proof follows from a well-known result in knapsack problem (for example, see [22] Theorem 2.2.1).
Lemma 10. Let b s c(H s ). Consider the following maximization problem.
The maximum is upper bounded by y
Proof. Clearly, it is enough to bound (M1) subject to the relaxation:
As the coefficients of b s in (M1) are positive, it is clear that setting b s = 1, for all s, will maximize (M1) without violating the Constraints (76) and (77). It is then enough to show that the optimum value z * of the following linear program is at
subject to max 0,
We write
where
Denote by c * s , for s = 1, ..., K, the optimal values maximizing f (c 1 , ..., c K ) subject to the constraints given in Eqn. (79). Note that We first note that we must have max 0, 
Note that α s > α s+1 for all s = 1, ..., K − 1. It follows that the choice S 1 = {1} maximizes f (c 1 , ..., c K ) and the lemma follows.
B. Usage Based Cost-Sharing Mechanism
We construct a similar instance to the one in Sec. V-A. There are K · K! participants, indexed by N = {i t s | t = 1, ..., K, s = 1, ..., K!}. For any non-empty subset G ⊆ N and L ⊆ G, we define X G (L) as follows:
See an illustration of an example for setting X G (L) in Fig. 3 . 
• Case 3: Otherwise, G is a partition of m sets G = H 1 ∪ · · ·∪H m , where each H t is a maximal subset that satisfies either Case 1 or Case 2. Then, 
Therefore, the price of anarchy is lower bounded by
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 with p i = p ub i , we obtain
where H s = {i s , ..., i K }, with the corresponding default costs denoted by {c s , ..., c K }. Without loss of generality, we assume c(
|L| . Note that the monotone utilization condition is equivalent to saying that, for all s ∈ {1, ..., K − 1} and K ≥ t > s,
Hence, we can bound SPoA ub K by the maximum value of the linear optimization problem (P1):
For s ∈ {1, ..., K} and L ⊆ H s , we define
Then the dual problem to (P1) can be written as follows:
subject to
We next provide a primal-dual feasible pair (X * , λ * ) whose objective value is K s=1 1 s . To better understand this proof, it may be instructive to look at the example when K = 3 in Table II .
Primal solution:
For s ∈ {1, ..., K} and L ⊆ H s , we set
For s ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}, s < t ≤ K, we obtain
Also, we obtain
Hence, X * satisfies Constraint (93) and Constraint (94).
Dual solution:
We first claim that there is a set of numbers λ * (s, t) ≥ 0, for 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K that satisfy Constraint (98) as equalities.
To show this, we study the linear optimization problem (D2):
and its dual:
By Constraint (110), the primal problem (P2) is bounded; it is also feasible since X * s (L) for s ∈ {2, ..., K} given in Eqn. (101) For L ⊆ H 1 , we sum the equations in Constraint (106) for L ∩ H t for all t ∈ {2, ..., K} to obtain
Hence, Constraint (99) is satisfied.
Optimality:
Finally, the proof is completed by noting that
Theorem 7. Consider usage based cost-sharing for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost c f = 1. Then
Proof. Recall that T i is the a set of required usage timeslots of user i, T r is the set allowable timeslots of pass r, and F i (r(G)) = T i ∪ T r \( j∈G T j ) . For pass sharing problem, we note that X G (L) = 0 if 1 < |L| < |G|. Hence,
Since the average cost c f = 1, X G ({i}) = |T i |, and X G (G) = |T r \( j∈G T j )|.
Let H s {i s , ..., i K } andX max s∈{1,...,K} X s (H s ). Applying Lemma 1 with p i = p 
C. Existence of Stable Coalition Structures
This section investigates the existence of stable coalition structures considering different cost-sharing mechanisms. First, we define a cyclic preference as sequences (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , ..., G s ), where i k ∈ G k ∩ G k+1 for all k ≤ s − 1, and i s ∈ G s ∩ G 1 , such that
Proof. We include the standard argument for completeness (see, e.g., [12] for dynamic coalition formation by local improvements). Consider a directed graph G = (N K , E) on the set N K {S ∈ 2 N : |S| ≤ K} of subsets of size at most K. For two sets G 1 , G 2 ∈ N K , we define an edge (G 1 , G 2 ) ∈ E if and only if there is a participant i ∈ G 1 ∩ G 2 such that u i (G 1 ) < u i (G 2 ). Then the existence of a cyclic preference is equivalent to the existence of a directed cycle in G. Thus if there exists no cyclic preference, then G is acyclic and hence has at least one sink.
Let P be a maximal subset of sinks in G with the property that any two distinct nodes G, G ∈ P are pairwise disjoint. Let S be the set of participants covered by P, and G be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting all the nodes containing some participant in S.
By induction, there is a stable coalition structure P among the set of participants S N \S. It follows that P ∪ P is a stable coalition structure on the set of all participants. Indeed, if there is a blocking coalition G 1 then G 1 ∩ S = ∅ (since otherwise P is not stable among the participants in S ). But then there must exist i ∈ S such that contain u i (G 1 ) > u i (G 2 ), where G 2 ∈ P is the coalition containing i. This would imply that (G 2 , G 1 ) ∈ E contradicting that G 2 is a sink in G.
Theorem 8. For equal-split cost-sharing, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
Proof. If there exists a cyclic preference, defined by (i 1 , ..., i s ) and (G 1 , ..., G s ), then
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 > 0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
Theorem 9. For proportional-split cost-sharing, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
If there exists a cyclic preference defined by (i 1 , ..., i s ), (G 1 , ..., G s ) and (r 1 , ..., r s ), then
This generates a contradiction. Hence, there always exists a stable coalition structure.
